1. | ![]() |
Market Design and Two-Sided Matching | (1) Stability in one-sided matching: Resource Allocation on the basis ofpriorities. (1a) Characterization of Pareto efficient priority structures. (1b) Applications in school choice: The Boston mechanism; Indifferences inpriorities and random tie-breaking; The stable improvement cycles algorithm. |
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2. | ![]() |
Market Design and Two-Sided Matching | (1) Stability in one-sided matching: Resource Allocation on the basis ofpriorities. (1a) Characterization of Pareto efficient priority structures. (1b) Applications in school choice: The Boston mechanism; Indifferences inpriorities and random tie-breaking; The stable improvement cycles algorithm. |
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3. | ![]() |
Market Design and Two-Sided Matching | (1) Stability in one-sided matching: Resource Allocation on the basis ofpriorities. (1a) Characterization of Pareto efficient priority structures. (1b) Applications in school choice: The Boston mechanism; Indifferences inpriorities and random tie-breaking; The stable improvement cycles algorithm. |
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